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ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS1 JUDGMENTS CONCERNING MR. CRANE'S
CREDIBILITY ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE SUBSTANTIAL
QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW RAISED ON APPEAL;
ARE PRESENTED MERELY TO PREJUDICE THE COURT'S
DECISION; AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED BY THE
COURT AND STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD.
Utah

law

requires

that

briefs presented

on

appeal

"be

concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper
headings

and

scandalous

free

from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or
(Emphasis added.)11

matters.

Supreme Court, Rule 24(k).

Rules

of

the Utah

"Briefs which are not in compliance

may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the
Court, and/or the Court may assess attorney's fees against the
offending lawyer."
Large
Respondents1

Id.

portions
asserted

Respondents1

of

belief

that

Appellant

are

dedicated

Clifford

to

Crane's

(Respondents1 Brief, hereinafter

testimony lacks credibility.
RB, at 4, 9, 16-18, 30.)

Brief

Such assertions have no basis in the

trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and are
designed to prejudice this Court's ability to reach a neutral and
unbiased decision on the merits of the facts and laws considered
by the trial judge.

All such assertions are immaterial and

irrelevant to the correctness of the trial court's Judgment.
Pursuant to Utah, Appellants respectfully request that this
Court

disregard

constitute

all

prejudicial

portions

of

statements

Respondents'
concerning

Brief

which

Respondent's

credibility, specifically including those found on pages 4, 9,
-1-

16-18, and 30, be disregarded and stricken from the record on
appeal.

Respondents further implore this Court to concentrate

its review on the rulings of law as they have been applied to the
facts determined by the trial judge below.
POINT II
RESPONDENTS HAVE INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE "MAILBOX RULE", PERTAINING TO OFFER AN
ACCEPTANCE OF A CONTRACT, DOES NOT PERTAIN TO
THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE AND, THEREFORE,
ERR IN STATING THAT RESPONDENTS1 OFFER WAS
EFFECTIVELY WITHDRAWN PRIOR TO ACCEPTANCE.
Appellants urge the Court to review the laws relating to
offer and acceptance as outlined in their original brief, Point
I.

To counter Appellants1 argument that a contract was formed on

February 21, 1985, when Appellants1 California attorney placed a
letter of acceptance

(Plaintiffs1

Exhibit 19A) in the United

States Post Office, Respondents recite an exception to the rule
which

states

that

"an

offer

may

restrict

the

manner

of

acceptance, provided his or her intention to do so is clearly
expressed."

(RB at 19)

Respondents embellish their argument by

citing American Jurisprudence
validity

of

acceptance

by

Second which explains that the
mail

acceptance has been "authorized".

depends

upon

whether

such

(RB at 19)

The very sources of law cited by Respondents indicate that
the trial court erred in its application of the law to the facts
of record.

In fact, there was no "clear expression" on the part

of Respondents that would have indicated that acceptance by mail
was inappropriate.

The parties were dealing with each other at a

considerable distance and the offer itself was delivered by the
-2-

United

States

Postal

service*

Furthermore, Appellants

were

specifically "authorized" to "execute and send" all documents to
the closing agent.

(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 7)

Respondents attempt to base their argument against finding
the

formation

of

a contract

on statements

contained

in the

Agreements for Sale of Limited Partnership Interest (Plaintiffs1
Exhibits 8 and 9) and the letter to Mr. Mixon from Mr. Russell J.
Gallian

(Plaintiffs1

agreements.

Exhibit

(RB at 19)

12) which accompanied

the sales

These documents contain statements to

the effect that signed documents "shall be deposited with the
escrow agent to be delivered to buyer upon closing", and that
"upon receipt" of the signed agreements the escrow agent would
disburse the appropriate funds.
While the foregoing terms indicate that the escrow agent was
not free to act until the anticipated documentation was in its
possession, such terms provide no basis for concluding that a
contract between the parties had not been formed at an earlier
date.

If Respondents1 reasoning is accepted, what would prevent

them from claiming that acceptance would not be complete until
the

escrow

agent

"delivered

to

buyer

upon

closing"

the

anticipated documentation?
In other words, the arrangements Respondents made with Dixie
Title are not one and the same as the contract concluded between
the parties.

Respondents1 attack on the mailbox rule confuses

acceptance of an offer to contract with the conditions of closing
the escrow.

Deposit into escrow of the anticipated documents was

merely a condition of closing the escrow.
-3-

Even if the documents

had been lost in the mail, delaying the closing of escrow until
replacements

could

be

obtained,

a

contract

would

have

been

concluded at the time the originals were deposited in the Post
Office on February 21, 1985.
In addition, Respondents read too much into statements made
by

Mr.

Crane

deposited

that

with

transaction.

the

he

understood

escrow

(RB at 20)

that

agent

in

documents
order

to

were

to

complete

be
the

There is no indication in any of these

statements that Mr. Crane believed that formation of a contract
was dependent upon the escrow agent's actual possession of the
subject agreements.
opinion

that

an

In fact, Mr. Crane was of the belief and

agreement

had

been

concluded

as

early

as

November, 1984, a position he maintained throughout the trial of
this case.

Therefore, Respondents1 assertions that

(TR1 at 69)

"both parties understood

that Crane's acceptance was dependent

upon the actual deposit of documents with escrow, "are simply
inaccurate and misleading".

(RB at 21)

Respondents rely upon the case of Williams v. Singleton, 723
P.2d

421, 424

(Utah 1986), for the proposition that an offeror

may restrict the manner of offeree's acceptance.

Appellants do

not argue anything contrary, but do wish to remind the Court that
the Williams case requires that the offeror "clearly" express his
or her intention to do so.
an

Oregon

offeror

is

opinion

which

responsible

In fact, in Williams this Court cited
makes

to

it

restrict

absolutely
its

clear

anticipated

acceptance:
An
offeror
may
restrict
the
manner
of
acceptance, provided nis intention to do so is
clearly expressed.
-4-

that

the

modes

of

"The offeror creates the power of acceptance;
and he has full control over the character and
extent of the power that he creates. He can
prescribe a single and exclusive mode of
acceptance.
It makes no difference how
unreasonable or difficult the prescribed mode
may be, ^JL the offeror clearly expresses, in
the terms of the communicated offer itself,
his intention to exclude all other modes of
acceptance... .
(Original emphasis)" 1 C o r b m
on Contracts § 88, 373-374 (1963).
Cochran v. Connell, 632 P.2d 1385, 1387 (Or. App. 1981).
Respondents failed to make it clear that "all other modes of
acceptance"

were

unacceptable.

In

fact,

they

"clearly"

authorized acceptance by mail in the following passage:
Enclosed you will find documents which you
should execute and send to the closing agent
in connection with your sale of your Limited
Partnership interest in Timberbrook Village
Ltd.
The closing agent is Dixie Title Co.
Inc., 205 East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah
84770 (a self addressed envelope is enclosed
for your convenience). (Emphasis added)
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 7)
Appellants respectfully urge this court to conclude that the
Findings of Fact and the law of contracts in the State of Utah
demonstrate that the trial court has erred in its determination
that Mr. Mixon's letter of February 18, 1985, did not constitute
a valid and timely acceptance.
Respondents'

Third

Point

which

If this conclusions is reached,
claims

that

the

offer

was

effectively withdrawn on February 22, 1985, is without meaning or
effect on the existing contractual obligations.
POINT III
ANY
CONDITIONS
CONTAINED
IN
APPELLANTS1
ACCEPTANCE
WERE
ALREADY
IMPLIED
IN
THE
PARTIES1
CONTRACT AND, AS SUCH, DO
NOT
CONSTITUTE A COUNTEROFFER.
-5-

To avoid any undue repetition. Appellants refer the Court to
their

original

brieff

Point

II, for

a

full

examination of

arguments against Respondents1 claim that Mr. Mixon's letter of
February
additional

18f

1985,

constituted

conditions

to

the

emphasize, however, that

the

a

counteroffer

contract.

by

Appellants

trial court's Findings

proposing
wish

to

of Fact

considered only one of three supposed "conditions" to be a new
element which

invalidated

the original offer.

Based on the

arguments heretofore outlined, this Court should conclude that
the trial court committed reversible error in adopting Finding of
Fact No. 19.
Respondents

attempt

to

further

confuse

this

issue

by

introducing a supposed "new condition" which was not included in
the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

They

argue that dismissal of the accounting suit which was instigated
by Mr. Crane, as a limited partner, to determine the state of the
Timberbrook's

records

was

also

a

condition

which

satisfied before Respondents "felt a duty to close".

must

be

(RB at

26-27).
While the trial court took notice of the accounting lawsuit,
it never concluded, neither was there any discussion of the fact,
that such an action constituted an additional condition which
must be satisfied prior to concluding the subject agreement.
(Finding of Fact No. 11)

As a limited partner in Timberbrook

Village, Ltd., Mr. Crane was entitled by law to examine the books
of

the partnership

to assure
-6-

that his interests were being

properly protected.

In fact, Mr. Crane had attempted to examine

the records, but was unsuccessful in his attempts.

(TR1 at 77)

Furthermore, it is unclear that Respondents communicated any
expectation

that

the

accounting

condition to contract formation.

law

suit

be

dropped

as a

Respondents1 Brief argues that

Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 13 (P-13), a letter from Mr. Russell Gallian
to Mr. Willard R. Bishop, dated February 11, 1985, conclusively
demonstrates

that

contract formation.

dismissal

was

required

as

a

condition of

(RB at 26-27)

Quite to the contrary, however, this letter presents only
confusion concerning the actual state of contract negotiations.
The entire body of the letter (P-13) reads as follows:
I apologize for not responding to your earlier
letters but
I've
since had
substantial
discussions
with
Mr. Crane's
California
attorney and I took his direction that the
problem had been solved.
As you may or may not know, we had a deal with
Mr. Crane to buy out his interest some time
ago. Since that time, Mr. Crane came to the
Timberbrook offices and was given full access
to the books and records and I assume that he
was satisfied from that effort because his
attorney has now instructed that they intend
to go ahead with the purchase of his interest.
We are now awaiting documents to be placed in
escrow at Dixie Title Company, at which time
tne closing will be completed and Mr. Crane
will no longer be associated with Timberbrook.
Accordingly, I am assuming that the variouis
problems we may have had with Mr. Crane are
now solved. If this is not the case, I would
be pleased to hear from you. I think that any
problems that we may have had with Mr. Crane
are now resolved. (Emphasis added)
As the Court can easily see, Mr. Gallian believed that the
buy out deal had been struck "some time ago."
-7-

It is of interest

that Respondents, including Mr. Gallian, would now attempt to use
this same letter as an indication that no contract had been
concluded.

In addition, it can be seen that the letter relied on

by Respondents does not provide the "clear" expression required
for an offeror

to condition offeree's mode or expression of

acceptance.
It is also interesting to note that on the very same day
P-13 was sent to Mr. Bishop and copied to Mr. Mixon, Mr. Gallian
sent a second letter (P-12) to Mr. Mixon which directly discussed
the "Substitution of Guarantor" aspect of the contract, one of
the supposed "conditions," but never so much as mentioned the
idea that the accounting suit must be dropped prior to contract
formation.
Given that (1) Mr. Crane was pursuing his lawful rights as a
limited partner, (2) that Respondents never argued at trial that
dismissal of the accounting lawsuit was a condition to formation
of the contract, (3) that Respondents1 never clearly communicated
any expectation that the accounting lawsuit be dropped prior to
contract formation, and (4) that there is no Finding of Fact or
Conclusion of Law issued by the trial court on the subject,
Respondents

should

not

be allowed

to raise

the matter, nor

prevail thereon, initially on appeal.
Appellants also urge this Court to conclude that the letter
of February 18, 1985, contained no new conditions which would
constitute a counteroffer, that such a letter was a valid and
timely

acceptance

to

Respondents1

ongoing

offer,

and

that

Respondents are bound to specifically perform all aspects of the
subject contract.

CONCLOSION
In conclusion, Appellants assert that the task of this Court
is to objectively review the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law as adopted by the trial court below to determine if there is
evidence to support the same and whether any reversible error has
been

committed.

This

Court

should

refuse

to

consider

the

immaterial and irrelevant judgments of Respondents as to their
assessment of Mr. Crane's credibility.

In so doing, it should

become apparent that there are only two issues in this case:

(1)

is the "mailbox rule" for contract formation viable in the State
of Utah and applicable under the facts of this case?; and, (2)
Did Appellants' acceptance of Respondents' offer contain any new
conditions, which were not anticipated as a part of the contract,
which

would

require

the

finding

that Mr. Mixon's

letter of

February 18, 1985, constituted a counteroffer?
Appellants urge the Court to find that the "mailbox rule" is
applicable to the present circumstances; that, in accordance with
the

trial

acceptance

court's
was

Findings

of

dispatched

Fact, Appellants'

before

Respondents'

letter

of

attempted

revocation; that such letter of acceptance was unconditional and
did not amount to a counteroffer; and that tnere were no other
conditions which would have precluded the formation of a valid
and binding contract at the time the letter of acceptance was
posted.
If the Court

reaches these conclusions, the Cranes also

respectfully request that the Court vacate the decision of the
trial

court

and

remand

with
-9-

instructions

to enter

a proper

judgment which requires Dixie Title to disburse the $175,000,
along with all appropriate interest, held in escrow to them and
that they be awarded costs on appeal and reasonable attorney
fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /tffL

<3ay of July, 1988.

JILLARD" R. ^BISHOP
Attorney for Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I mailed four
correct

copies of

the above and

foregoing

(4) full, true and
APPELLANTS1

REPLY

BRIEF, to Mr. Michael D. Hughes, Attorney for Respondents, of
THOMPSON,

HUGHES

&

REBER,

Attorneys

at

Law,

at

148

East

Tabernacle Street, St. George, Utah 84770, by first-class mail,
postage fully prepaid this /yuL day of /July, 1988.
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